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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 10-1303 & 10-3355 
 ___________ 
 
 HERMANAWAN TANZIL, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
          Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A096-203-764) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 2, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 4, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Hermanawan Tanzil, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of two 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions denying his motions to reopen.  We 
consolidated the cases and will now deny the petitions for review. 
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I. 
 Given the narrow ambit of our review, we will only briefly recapitulate the 
background of this case.  Tanzil is an ethnic Chinese Christian from Indonesia, who 
traveled to the United States for pleasure and overstayed his visa.  After the 
commencement of removal proceedings, he filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Tanzil appeared before 
Immigration Judge (IJ) Rosalind K. Malloy, who determined that his failure to file within 
the one-year deadline rendered him statutorily ineligible for asylum.  See Certified 
Administrative Record (A.)
1
 275.  The IJ also held that Tanzil had failed to demonstrate 
(based on the facts of his case and his evidentiary submissions) a pattern or practice of 
persecution against ethnic Chinese or specific instances of past persecution; accordingly, 
she denied withholding and protection under the CAT.  A.279–80.  The BIA agreed, 
denying his appeal of the withholding and CAT claims.  A.245–46. 
 We held that substantial record evidence supported the agency‘s outcome, and 
denied Tanzil‘s petition for review of the denial of withholding of removal.  See Tanzil v. 
Att‘y Gen., 330 F. App‘x 396, 397 n.1, 399 (3d Cir. 2009).  In so doing, we addressed 
Tanzil‘s claim that his evidence demonstrated a ―pattern or practice‖ of persecution 
against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, noting that the 2003 and 2004 country reports on 
Indonesia, which were part of his evidentiary submission, did not compel such a 
                                                 
 
1
 All citations are to the administrative record submitted in C.A. No. 10-3355, 
which is the more comprehensive and up-to-date of the two. 
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conclusion—an issue we had addressed in Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att‘y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 
233– 34 (3d Cir. 2008).  But we also reviewed the other background materials Tanzil 
submitted, finding that they too did not mandate an outcome in his favor.  Tanzil, 330 F. 
App‘x at 398. 
 Since that time, Tanzil has filed two functionally identical motions to reopen and 
reconsider with the BIA.  In his first, submitted on June 29, 2009, Tanzil presented 
―evidence [that] was not available at the time of the briefing that was submitted in 2007‖ 
to support his contention that ―conditions are worsening, not improving in Indonesia for 
people like the Respondents [sic].‖  A.82.  The evidence consisted of an Indonesian 
government report and a ―rebuttal‖ NGO report on human-rights conditions and 
discrimination in Indonesia, along with a transcript of testimony given by Dr. Jeffrey 
Winters ―from a substantially similar case of a claim by ethnic Chinese Indonesians for 
asylum.‖  A.82.  Tanzil argued that ―[t]he additional evidence submitted directly 
contradict[ed] the final Board findings and is consistent with Dr. Winters‘ testimony,‖ in 
that it demonstrated ―a pattern or practice of persecution‖ rooted in ―a de jure system of 
discriminatory laws.‖  A.85–86.  Moreover, the new submissions ―clearly show[ed] that 
the Government of Indonesia cannot or will not protect its Chinese and Christian citizens 
from private Islamic fundamentalists.‖  A.88. 
 The BIA disagreed, denying the motion to reopen because the ―evidence [did] not 
meaningfully reflect ‗changed country‘ conditions in Indonesia sufficient to warrant the 
reopening of proceedings.‖  A.56.  In doing so, it described the Indonesian government 
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report as being of ―an uncertain origin.‖  It also advised Tanzil that his reliance on the 
Ninth Circuit‘s ―disfavored group‖ analysis was misplaced, given this Circuit‘s rejection 
of that standard.  A.56. 
 Tanzil responded to this adverse ruling by filing a petition for review with this 
Court.  He then submitted a second motion to reopen or to reconsider with the BIA 
―based on the Board‘s incorrect finding that an Exhibit submitted by the Respondent in 
support of his Motion was of uncertain origin.‘‖  A.9.  He further complained that the 
BIA‘s decision was ―completely devoid of any consdieration [sic] of this document, 
much less of the fact that it constitutes the official Indonesian government statement on 
discrimination.‖  A.9.  The BIA granted the motion to reconsider, but affirmed its earlier 
ruling that the contents of the government report, ―considered along with the 
documentation submitted in support of the motion to reopen filed on June 22, 2009, [did 
not] warrant the reopening of proceedings insofar as the documents do not meaningfully 
reflect changed conditions in Indonesia.‖  A.3.  Tanzil filed a second petition for review 
with this Court.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Recognizing that motions 
to reopen, which are governed in the immigration agency context by 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c),
2
 are entitled to the deference normally afforded an agency‘s interpretations 
                                                 
 
2
 We agree with the Government that Tanzil‘s motions to reopen were filed long 
after the time period allowed by the applicable regulations.  The BIA rendered its merits 
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of its own regulations, we review the BIA‘s decisions for abuse of discretion.  See INS v. 
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 
2005).  ―Discretionary decisions of the BIA will not be disturbed unless they are found to 
be ‗arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.‘‖  Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted).
3
 
                                                                                                                                                             
decision on March 25, 2008; Tanzil‘s first motion was filed on June 19, 2009.  This is 
significantly ―later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision 
was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.‖  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  
Inasmuch as Tanzil limited his arguments to ―changed circumstances‖ arising in 
Indonesia, the BIA could and did still entertain the motions.  See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
 
 
3
 Tanzil misidentifies the standard of review that should apply to his petition.  In 
his brief, he asserts that ―[t]his court reviews questions of law under the de novo 
standard‖—later, he simplifies this to ―[t]he Court‘s review is de novo‖—and charges us 
with determining whether ―[the BIA‘s] ‗pattern or practice‘ determination did not apply 
appropriate standards for the definition of persecution and was made without full 
consideration of all evidence.‖  Pet‘r‘s Br. 9.  While technically not incorrect insofar as 
review of law is concerned—indeed, if motions to reopen turn entirely on questions of 
law, we review the BIA‘s legal conclusions de novo, see Luntungan v. Att‘y Gen., 449 
F.3d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 2006)—Tanzil does little to situate his petition in such a category 
of case.  Other portions of Tanzil‘s proffered standard would be more appropriate if we 
were reviewing his final order of removal, the time for which has long since passed.  A 
motion to reopen is the proverbial second bite at the apple, whose disposition is generally 
based on internal regulations, BIA discretion, and a heavy dependence on fact, but 
nowhere in his briefs does Tanzil acknowledge (or, indeed, tailor his arguments to) our 
generally circumscribed level of review.  Moreover, the abuse of discretion standard we 
apply in this context is neither novel nor obscure.  See, e.g., Zheng v. Att‘y Gen., 549 
F.3d 260, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2008); McAllister v. Att‘y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 
 We would be inclined to attribute this to an error in drafting if not for Tanzil‘s 
insistence on adhering to his proffered de novo approach even after the Government 
pointed out his error.  See Gov‘t‘s Br. 13; Pet‘r‘s Reply Br. 2.  In any case, Tanzil has not 
justified the use of any alternative standard of review, and we will proceed under abuse of 
discretion analysis. 
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III. 
 We cannot find that the BIA abused its discretion in declining to reopen 
proceedings on either occasion.  First, Tanzil has not shown that the BIA shirked its duty 
to analyze the evidence before it.  He argues that ―[t]he two Board decisions at issue in 
this Petition do not provide substantive analysis of the information contained in the 
CERD Report, the NGO Report or the expert testimony,‖ Pet‘r‘s Br. 8, but immediately 
thereafter acknowledges that ―[t]he first Board decision of December 29, 2009 . . . recited 
the evidentiary submissions.‖  The BIA need not write an exegesis on every document 
submitted, see Wong v. Att‘y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), and it is Tanzil‘s 
burden to show that the BIA actively failed to consider the evidence, see Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2001).  The BIA‘s recitation of the evidence suffices 
to show its consideration thereof, especially in tandem with statements like ―[a] review of 
the report does not support [Petitioner‘s] contention.‖ A.3; see also Toussaint v. Att‘y 
Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 2006).  An active demonstration of ―substantive 
analysis‖ is not necessary; nor, for that matter, is coming to a conclusion contrary to the 
one favored by the Petitioner sufficient to show lack of consideration. 
 Moreover, some of the ostensible BIA decisions to which Tanzil objects do not 
appear to be reflected in the record.  He asserts, for example, that the BIA placed 
―excessive weight on prior decisions that were based in older [State Department] 
Reports‖ instead of considering the new evidence submitted.  Pet‘r‘s Br. 12.  One of the 
cases he identifies is Sioe Tjen Wong.  But the BIA did not ―rely‖ on the factual 
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background of Sioe Tjen Wong in the decisions that are the subject of this petition; 
instead, it cited the case to demonstrate this Circuit‘s rejection of the Ninth Circuit‘s 
―disfavored group‖ analysis.  Nor do we find any record support for Tanzil‘s claim—
which follows a broadside on the general reliability of State Department reports—that 
―[t]he approach of the Board in this decision . . . appears to be returning to the once-
universally rejected primacy of the [State Department] Reports,‖ or his similar contention 
that ―the Board‘s finding essentially upholds its reliance on this Court‘s previous 
decisions that relied on those outdated and incomplete [State Department] Reports.‖   
Pet‘r‘s Br. 19–20.  The BIA‘s decisions were appropriately, and narrowly, confined to 
whether the new evidence presented demonstrated changed country conditions sufficient 
to warrant reopening, and we do not see where the BIA allegedly overspilled those 
boundaries. 
 Turning to the substantive merits of the evidence, we simply cannot agree with 
Tanzil that his submissions demonstrated changed country conditions, especially under 
the ―clear probability‖ withholding of removal standard and our own deferential standard 
of review.  The NGO report, which he describes as a ―scathing‖ commentary on the 
Indonesian government‘s own summary of its record on human rights and discrimination, 
is far more equivocal and technical than he implies, and would appear to take issue with 
the government‘s response to past atrocities, the inefficiencies of Indonesia‘s court 
system with regard to discriminatory acts, and the pace of the government‘s 
implementation of liberalizing, democratizing, and integrating reforms—a noble critique, 
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to be sure, but not one showing changed country conditions implicating renewed 
persecution of ethnic Chinese.
4
  Dr. Winters‘s testimony criticizes ―piecemeal‖ reform 
efforts and predicts future violence, A.204–216, but is similarly inconclusive.  In sum, the 
BIA did not abuse is discretion when it declined to reopen proceedings based on this 
evidence. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the consolidated petitions for review. 
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 Nor do Tanzil‘s descriptions of the NGO report always jibe with its actual 
contents.  In his motion to reopen, for example, Tanzil cited paragraph 166 of the report 
for the conclusion that ―most victims of discrimination and these crimes are ethnically 
Chinese (a group barely mentioned in the Government report).‖  A.85.  But the NGO 
report is less clear on this point, as it reports that ―[m]ost victims are Chinese ethnic and 
other ethnics/tribes specifically connected with their identity of their religion or belief.‖  
A.174 (emphasis added). 
